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The above phrase, coined by the medieval commentators on
Justinian's legislation, describes the rule that a legal trans-
action may be avoided or rescinded on the ground of great dis-
proportion in value of the reciprocal advantages which were the
subject of the agreement.1 In Anglo-American equity juris-
prudence various expressions are used to justify this type of
rescission; the contract is termed "unconscionable", "oppres-
sive", obtained by "undue influence", or containing such gross-
ly inadequate consideration as to evince fraud, treated, however,
as "constructive".
HISTOR1Y OF THE DOCTRINES
A. Till Justinian
Of ancient laws other than the Roman, only two, the Chinese
and Jewish, offer anything clearly relevant to the topie.2 Antici-
pating the famous rescript of Diocletian as later construed in
this article, the Chinese code penalized those who used a position
of power to exact usurious interest or to compel a sale or pur-
chase upon unfair terms.3 The crime was assimilated to that of
receiving bribes for a lawful purpose and the offender was com-
pelled to restore what he received to its former owner, forfeiting
to the state what he gave. The Jewish law is without example
in its severity, permitting rescission if the disproportion is as
slight as a sixth. This appears to be confined to movable prop-
erty, the Roman requirement that the lesion be ultra dirnidian
obtaining for transfers of land.4 Further details may be
* Professor of Law, Harvard Law School. A. B. 1920; LL. B. 1924;
S. J. D. 1925, Harvard.
"The assertion that the doctrine was never applied to gratuitous
transactions is examined infra n. 29.
'A few vague references to the laws or customs of the Hindus,
Egyptians, Mlahometans, and Greeks have been collected by Bendeltini,
255 ff. According to Cuq. Et. dr. Bab. 388, the Babylonians allowed a
co-owner to rescind a division upon discovering its inequality. The
parallel passage of the Roman law (C. 3.38.3) is discussed infra.
3Ta Tsing Len Lee, Sec. 349, tr. Staunton; cf. for details Boulais,
Code Chinois, 661 ff.
'Cf. Pineles, 77, Kadushin, Jewish Code of Jurisprudence 963 ff.
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studied in Kadushin; here it is only necessary to add that the
relief is refused if the seller knew the bargain to be unfavorable
to him, but was forced to it by need of money. This system thus
rejects what is universally conceived as the basis of our doctrine,
i. e., the exploitation of weakness, and depends upon a presump-
tion of fraud, most remarkable in view of the exiguity of the
"overreaching". The idea that the relief is accorded merely
for a mistake is refuted by the rubric, translated by Kadushin
as "Law of Business Fraud". Of these two systems, neither of
which had any known influence on others, it may be remarked
that the first is thoroughly modern in its standpoint and the
other sui generis.
As is well known, the origin of our doctrine in European
law is a rescript attributed in Justinian's Code (4.44.2) to
Diocletian and Maximian, A. D. 285, of which the following is a
literal translation. "If you or your father sold a thing of a
greater value for a lesser price, it is humane that either return-
ing the price to the buyers you receive the farm sold, the author-
ity of the judge intervening, or if the buyer so desires, that you
receive what is lacking to the fair price. Moreover, it seeming
to be a lesser price if half of the true value was not paid. ' 5
This laconic bit of legislation has caused such endless discussion
that its careful consideration is excusable if not necessary.
When the Corpus Juris was the reigning statute law it was neces-
sary to determine whether the rule was the exception, to be
restrictively interpreted, or the statement of a principle general
in its application. This in turn depends on the previous state
of the law as exemplified in the Digest. On the question the
authorities were fairly equally divided, their solutions usually re-
flecting the same difference in conception of social policy which
causes today such lively dispute as to the justice of our institu-
tion.6 The recent tendency has been to regard the rescript as
having been falsified by Justinian, to whom the genesis of the
idea is attributed.7
5As usual in Latin the same word (pretium) is used for price
and value. It is hoped that the choice of nouns speaks for itself. On
the phrases verum and justum prethum see de Senarclens, Mel,
Fournier, 685.
0 The references may be found in Vangcrow, 327 ff.
7 Solazzi gives sufficient details as to this controversy, conducted
at times with considerable acrimony.
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As to whether the Romans before Diocletian were affected
by extraordinary inequality of a bargain the burden of proof is
admittedly on the proponents of the affirmative, for the Digest
refuses relief on this ground as regards sales and leases.8 Of
the passages cited as favorable only those not adequately dis-
posed of deserve treatmentY The rule that the price is reduced
for a buyer who has the usufruct is unlike ours in requiring a
mistake and depends on the principle that usufruct is a pars
dotini.'0 Moreover the buyer might be quite as impoverished
if the usufruct were outstanding, but would then have to await
eviction. The aid accorded husband or wife prejudiced by in-
correct valuation of the dos is clearly irrelevant, since the wife
was forbidden by law to make any agreement impairing her posi-
tion.'" The mutual desire to gain at the other's expense which
is the essence of a sale or lease, would here not be countenanced
if it existed. This same element may be held to explain another
passage allowing correction of an inequitable decision by an
arbiter chosen by partners to name their proper shares.' 2 The
contract of partnership implied a quasi "fraternal" relationship
incompatible with the intention to overreach one another. The
conclusion does not seem surprising that the parties were not
bound by an agreement depending on a serious error in valuation
of the assets contributed. - Such indeed is the effect of the limita-
tion to sale and lease of the transactions in which overreaching
is "naturally permitted". No question of lesion arose in any
other of the Roman nominate contracts.' 3
A more difficult problem is presented by the texts, all of
Diocletian, allowing relief for lesion in a division accomplished
by co-owners. 14 A division is an exchange (permutatio) of a
'19.2.22.3.ff.
'On 18.1.54 see Lenel, Palingenisia, cf. also 21.1.1.8. The most
superficial examination is enough to discard the sometimes cited
10.2.38 and 21.2.47. In spite of Solazzi, 57 n. 2, fraud is clearly pre-
supposed in C. 2.50.5.1. In 45.1.36 the contract when reduced to the
proper form failed to correspond as intended to the terms previously
settled.
10 18.1.17; cf. Harv. Legal Essays, 495 n. 60.
u The texts are 23.3.6.2; id. 12.1; cf. Czyhlarz, R. Dotalrecht, 159 fr.
for the limitations of the analogy to a sale.
' 17.2.79.
23 Three were gratuitous; mutuum was covered by the usury laws;
and pledge conveyed only a conditional and temporary right, cf.
13.7.1.2.
1 C. 3.38.3; cf. Consult. 2.5.7.
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part of one thing for part of another and exchanges are like
sales typically bargaining transactions. That the result cannot
reasonably be restricted to a case of actual fraud is sufficiently
proved by the fact that a recent writer has been forced to hold
interpolated the receipt as it appears in the Consultatio. 15 In
Consult. 2.7 we are told that a division not made bona fide may
be corrected without recourse to the restitution usually accorded
even to majors, which extraordinary remedy is mentioned in
C. 2.53.3 as a peculiarity of bona fide actions. Herewith a fresh
problem is presented; for there appears to be no need for the res-
titution in view of the existence of the contract action.16 More-
over the theory that any of this represents an innovation by Jus-
tinian or even Diocletian runs counter to the tenor of these pas-
sages, which treat the rules as a matter of course. 17 As regards
the ground for the relief against the division it may be remarked
that such a transaction usually differs from the ordinary ex-
change, instead of bargaining each for what he wishes the parties
are attempting to divide on the basis of an equal valuation. The
relief against any serious error in the appraisal is then an ex-
ample of the general principle distinguishing mistakes in the
performance from those in the formation of a contract.18 The
injured party who was never bound by the contract (innominate)
has in theory a condictio sine causa of which the exact amount
can be discovered only by the divisory action. In short the
division is not complete since it has not settled the cross claims
of the parties. It remains to consider the implication that the
extraordinary restitution is necessary if the contract was bind-
ing. The case may be supposed of a sale for a price to be deter-
mined by an arbiter, whose decision is surprisingly high or low.
If he reached the conclusion by malice the transaction is void,
for the condition that he use his judgment was not fulfilled. If,
I, Albertario, Arch. Giur, 100.238; cf. the vacillations of Accarias,
Precis, 2.419 n. 2.884 n. 1. It may be noted that the plural fraudes
is very far from definite in the Latin language.
" See Vangerow, 1.303. Few of those who attempt to deny the
existence of the restitution have considered the rubric of C. 2.53 and
none the express reference in Consult. 2.7, which refutes the idea that
the former passage referred to a case of absence, so Duquesne, Mel
Fournier, 199.
"Far from finding the principle anomalous Cuq. cit. supra, n. 2
reproaches the law for delaying until the time of Diocletian.
18Cf. the condictio indebiti; Foulke, 11 Col. L. Rev. 303; Harv.
Legal Essays, 483 if; see also C. 4.44.8 cit. infra.
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however, he made an honest serious error, the parties are bound
by the contract, for they assumed the risk of defects in his judg-
ment. Here then is a case for restitution on the ground that the
transaction was bona fide, provided that the decision is such that
it would not have been reached by a reasonable man not affected
by an extraordinary error. The fact that the injured seller may
have either an action on the contract, if the buyer was fraudu-
lent, or a condition if the sale was void for fraud of the arbiter,
or a claim for restitution, is enough to explain the plural actiones
in 16.3.2, the final passage cited for the existence of the lesion
before Diocletian. 19
All this only reinforces the conclusion, now generally es-
poused, that our main rescript introduced a new doctrine to the
law, and the next question concerns the reason. As already
noted the present tendency is to attribute the rule to an inter-
polation by Justinian, the objections to the form and substance
of the rescript having been best developed by Brassloff. 20 These,
however, relate only to the second half of the text, and the rule
itself can be removed only by the excessively arbitrary expedient
of Solazzi, who rearranges the passage to speak of fraud with a
decision analogous to that in 0. 4.44.10. No answer has been or
apparently can be given to the question why Justinian's com-
pilers should have selected this harmless and indeed banal pro-
nouncement to receive the honor of such an epoch making inno-
vation. It seems indeed incredible that instead of giving him-
self just credit for the idea Justinian should have taken the
trouble falsely to attribute it to the pagan persecutor. The con-
clusion is obvious; Diocletian allowed the recission but Justinian
altered the conditions therefor required. The conjecture has
been advanced that the original case was one in which the buyer
was a magnate or potentior, a class who at this time in Rome
were productive of much difficulty.21 Many phenomena tend to
confirm this hypothesis. All except the last sentence of C. 4.44.8
is devoted to refuting the idea that anything theretofore pro-
19 It is thus unnecessary to recur to the allegation of interpolation,
more plausible in this case than usual.
-0 The number of the buyer changes; the verb "receive" is un-
necessarily repeated, and the mathematical test is suitable neither in
a rescript nor in the law of Diocletian, whose enactments possess
most of the pregnant good sense of the great lawyers.
See Monnier, Nouv. Rev. Hist. 1900 pass, esp. 181.
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vided (i. e., C. 2.53.3; 4.44.2) permits reeission for mere inade-
quacy of price. The reference in our rescript to "you or your
father" becomes explicable if the ground of complaint lay in the
personal relation of the parties, whence it might be deduced that
the privilege of rescission died with the seller. Similarly the
change of number as regards the buyer indicates that facts on
that point (one or more being potentiores) have been omitted
by the compiler. Sales of land compelled by potentiores are
elsewhere mentioned and condemned. 22  If the rescript was so
limited, the anomaly disappears that the succeeding Christian
emperors refuse to recognize the general doctrine of laesio
enormis, and it is quite natural to find them ordering rescission
on the ground of potentia.23 The theory was, then, one of duress
(metus) and the remedy the usual restitution in integrun .
2
4
Hence it is Oat the signs of interpolation begin at the moment
the buyer is accorded the option to make up the price, which
would be unjustifiable if he had exercised compulsion. Jus-
tinian apparently wished to avoid the confession of weakness in
his administration by ignoring any such theory and making the
test mathematical and the buyer innocent.2 5 There is less temer-
ity in this suspicion as well as that of the end of C. 4.44.8 since
the contrary passages in the Theodosian code have either been
omitted from that of Justinian, or altered so as to accord with
the present condition of the main rescript.
B. After Justinian.
In 1851 Theodor Mommsen wrote, "as a reasonable man
may well write the history of Prussia but not that of the Charlot-
tenstrasse in Berlin so may one who feels competent trace and
develop the idea of ownership through the various systems, but
(our) lex has no history".26 Notwithstanding this pronuncia-
mento immense effort has since been devoted to pursuing the
minutiae of the doctrine throughout the ages. Thus even if it
2C. 10.34.1.1; cf. C. 4.47.2.
C. Th. 3.1.1,4,7. The case of rescission from Chron. Pasc. may
be found in ianel, Corpus Legum, 223, cit. Solazzi, 69.
2This explains the reference to the intervention of judicial
authority, whereon see Zachariae, 57 if.: Brassloff 271 if.
0 The option has caused the interpreters to excuse the buyer if
the thing is deteriorated or destroyed, cf. Vangerow, 331.
M Jur. Schr. 3.573 (a review of Chambon's Beltrage); herewith
Kittelmann opens his thesis.
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were desirable it would be scarcely possible to discover anything
novel, and it remains only to mention the references, with the
briefest suiumary of their content.
The fate of the rule in Byzantium is followed by Zachariae,
whose citations show that the immediate successors of Justinian
were no clearer as to its purpose and extent than later investiga-
tors. In spite of doubts the result seems to have been to restrict
the relief to the seller of land, and the claim was barred after
four years as if it were the extraordinary restitution in integrum.
Following the rubric and according to the above conjecture, this
latter deduction is incorrect, the intent having been to grant the
ordinary contract action.27 The tendency to restrict our remedy
in time has always been sensible; by the Jewish law above men-
tioned the buyer must get the goods appraised as soon as pos-
sible, and Art. 1676 of the French code establishes an absolute
term of two years, reduced to one by the Swiss. In the Western
section of the empire the barbarian codes follow that of Theo-
dosis in refusing to admit the relief for lesion.28
With the revival of learning at Bologna the doctrine comes
into its own and was at once extended in every direction: as to
the object transferred, which did not have to be land; as to the
person of the plaintiff, who could be the buyer; and as to the
nature of the transaction, which could be any "commutative
contract", bona fide, or stricti juris. Aleynial's assertion that
even gifts were included seems, however, unwarranted, though
some quite properly refused to take at its face value a statement
in the contract that a gift of the balance was intended.2s This
question of the renunciation of the privilege caused much dis-
cussion and led to the distinction between the laesio enormis and
enornzissima, which latter was considered conclusively to evince
fraud.3 0 Another hotly debated problem was the amount by
"wThe many later doubts on this point are described by Gluck,
67 ff., who with the majority decides for the actio venditi.
Hereon cf. Meynial, Mel. Girard, 2.201; Benedittini, 274 ft.
The application to gifts is denied with citations by Pinellus,
2.3.4. Meynial's quotation (St. Scialoia, 2.350 n. 1) from Bartolus is,
according to the copy here available, incorrect; with regard to the
gift he wrote non potest venire contra. In giving an illustration of a
transaction stricti juris Cynus was indeed betrayed into mentioning
a gift. It is indeed exceedingly difficult to imagine a case of this type,
cf. Pinellus, 2.3.10,11: one is a stipulation for payment of services too
dignified to be the subject of locatio, whereon infra.
10 This distinction is repeated in the Anglo-American formulation
of the rule mentioned infra.
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which the buyer had to be injured: if the seller of a thing worth
10 could rescind if he lost 6 it was argued that the buyer should
have the same right if he paid 16:31 The explanation of the
exceedingly favorable reception of the principle is doubtless to
be found in the attitude of the Church, which refused to recog-
nize the obligation to pay interest upon a loan, and whose law-
yers were hostile to commerce. The most refined dialectic was
expended in the attempt to define a fair price, which should be
absolutely invariable, and any departure from which should con-
stitute the crime of usury.32 The consequence of all which was
that at the end of the 18th century our doctrine was generally
recognized in theory and practice, except in France where it
encountered stubborn resistance and a great -willingness to ac-
cept the stereotyped clause waving the privilege of rescission.
33
At this period, that of the French revolution and of the English
utilitarian and laissez faire philosophy, the rule begins to meet
with hostility, the same which attached to the limitations of in-
terest upon loans of money. All such restrictions were abolished
in France by the revolutionists, and the lesion reappeared in the
code, restricted to the seller of land, only by the personal inter-
vention of Napoleon. In the Prussian code the remedy was,
curiously enough, confined to the buyer. The Code Napoleon
assigned no limit to the rate of interest which would be promised,
but a usury law soon followed it in 1807. As the century pro-
gressed, however, the hostility became more pronounced and the
Portuguese became the typical legislation, not mentioning the
lesion even in case of a division and placing no limit on contrac-
tual interest.3 4 The commercial code for Germany and Austria
of 1862 took the same attitude, although these nations have ever
been the most liberal in our sphere.3 5 The reaction set in at the
beginning of the present century with the passage of the German
2The excellent Averanius, Interp. Juris, 3.7, who was also a
mathematician, devoted himself with particular pleasure to the ex-
plosion of this heresy, cf. however, Mayn, Cours de D. R., 5.2.236 n. 10.
2Hereon see Endemann, St. in der Rom.-Kan. Wirths, u.
Rechtslehre 2.29-76; Kaulla, Zeits. f. d. ges. Staatswiss., 60.579.
"See Memin, Th. Paris, 1926, 87 ff., 125 ff.; and cf. Demontes,
24 ff. For the various Italian states see Benedittini, 278; and on the
reception in Germany Stobbe Handb. Deut. Privatr., 3.250.
14 Lists of the unfavorable codes with their dates may be found in
Pineles, 75 ff.; Morixe, 140.
5See also the references to the Saxon and Bavarian Codes In
Kittelmann, 92.
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Civil Code. Following a criminal statute of 1893 it introduced
to the civil law the concept of "real" usury (Sachfucher) and
declared void as contrary to good morals any transaction where-
by one exploits the need, recklessness, (Leichtsinn) or inexperi-
ence of another to gain advantages which in the circumstances
stand in surprising disproportion to what was rendered. This
provision, applicable also to commercial transactions, was repro-
duced in the Swiss Code of Obligations, added to the Austrian
Code by a Novel, adopted by the Project for a unified Franco-
Italian Code, and by the recent Polish Code of 1934.36 Moreover
in France it has excited the keenest interest and several bills in
the LegislatureY' Even though the French have not yet decided
to follow their neighbors across the Rhine to the full extent,38
their authors never tire of noting the numerous ways in which
the principle of lesion has been introduced by statute or judicial
decision. Examples are the laws of 1907 on the sale of fertilizer
in favor of the farmers, of 1915 against "sweat shops", of 1916
on contracts for marine salvage, the many war measures estab-
lishing maximum prices for necessities, the judicial legislation
whereby the courts reduced fees for professional services. The
same tendency may be observed in countries where the law is
absolutely hostile to the principle; Spain passed a usury statute
in 1908, Roumania in 1930, and in Argentina the same result
has recently been achieved by the courts on the ground that the
transaction is immoral. 30 Herefrom those who are opposed to
legislation on the ground of its futility, could draw an argument
in their favor: in times of prosperity the Germans and Swiss are
said to have made little or no use of their privilege of rescis-
sion,40 while the Argentinians obtain it in moments of stress
against the known desire of the legislator.
:, For the last two assertions see Bull. Soc. Leg. Comp (1933)
443, (1934) 332.
*7See the discussion of the committee in Bull. Etudes Legis.
(1922) 25.
"Signs of nationalistic prejudice are not infrequent, cf. the just
cited Bull., 37, and on the other side Ennecerus "u". * i. f.
' See Morixe 143 n. 10.225; Bull. S. L. C. (1931) 387; for Sweden
cf. Bull. S. E. C. cit. 39 ff.
4 This alleged fact is much dwelt on by the French authors, cf.
e. g. Demontes, 70 fE. Whether or not it was once true in Germany
it is certain that since the war the cases under Art. 138 (2) are
legion, cf. B. G. B., Bersau, et al. (1934), 1.224 ff.
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ENGLAND AND A ERICA4 1
Though not recognized by the law stricto sensu (the ius
civile) the doctrine of rescission for lesion is extensively applied
by the courts of chancery or equity who administer the ius
honorarium corrective of the strict law; the broadest statement
of the principle is that contracts which "shock the conscience"
42
will not only not be enforced in equity but will be annulled or re-
scinded. As there seems much reason to suppose that the earlier
chancellors treated contracts according to the theories of the
canon or ecclesiastical law, it need occasion no surprise that defi-
nite rules are almost impossible to deduce from the cases. All
that can be said is that the courts of equity possess and employ
wider discretion in the matter than those of any other system yet
mentioned. Not only is gross inadequacy of consideration a
ground for rescission if advantage has been taken of the neces-
sity, weak-mindedness, ignorance, illiteracy, intoxication or
senility of the other, but there exist certain classes of persons
like sailors and expectant heirs whose position is or was hardly
distinguishable from that of a minor. All of which has been
summarized as a "principle applying to all the variety of rela-
tions in which dominion may be exercised by one party over the
other". 4 3 As to the immediate question at issue; the effect of
inadequacy of consideration by itself, it is usually said that
it is of no importance unless so gross as to be presump-
tive evidence of fraud. This of course means nothing until the
nature of the presumption is determined. If it is rebuttable,
the definition adds nothing to what has already been said about
exploitation of weakness, etc. Although the rule may be often
stated as if the presumption were conclusive, e. g. by Pomeroy,
Sec. 927, with citations, it is difficult if not impossible to find a
case in which the injured party did not suffer from one or more
of the above mentioned defects. 44 Indeed, as has been remarked,
without any such element the transaction is nothing but a volun-
4The main authority for the following is 2 Pomeroy, Equity
Jurisp. 4 ed., sees. 924, 928, 937, 963; cf. also Bigelow, Fraud 351-384;
Walsh, Equity, 22 ff.; 481 ff.
4 For this expression see Abbott v. Sworder, 4 De G. & Sm. 448,
461 (1852).
43 See Dent v. Bennett, 4 Myl. & C. 269, 277 (1839).
41 Of. the remarks of Walsh, op. cit. 482-3.
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tary gift.4 5 This possibility has induced a French court to ignore
the article of the Code which allows rescission for lesion in spite
of a waiver.46, Moreover, if the plaintiff has any characteristics
of a trader or merchant, courts of equity tend to treat him with
the utmost severity.47
Sov=T RussA
In artioles 33 of their civil code the Russians adopt a principle
analogous to that of the Germans, holding void a transaction
"manifestly unfavorable" and contracted under "extreme
necessity". The novelty of the provision lies in the fact that
the complaint may be made not only by the injured person but
also by the state or the proper social organizations. This
peculiarity has been attributed to the desire to protect one too
poor to institute a law suit,48 but it may be observed that the
state has a personal interest, for as in China it confiscates what
was rendered by the exploiter. 49 Theoretically, if not practical-
ly, a host of difficulties is presented by unwillingness to sue on the
part of the injured person. Descending from tbe general to the
particular it is interesting to discover an attempt to revive the
medieval canon law principle of an absolute "just price", any
deviation from which renders the transaction void. The
supreme court has had to confine this doctrine to necessities,
and even then denies relief if the plaintiff is rich.5o It is a
piquant phenomenon that the logical extreme of our doctrine has
been espoused by the Bolsheviks and the Roman Catholic Church
and its absolute negation by the French Revolutionists and the
Spencerian philosophers of the last century. In conclusion cita-
tions are unnecessary to prove the notorious fact that in recent
years Germany, Italy, and the U. S. A. have adopted a policy of
legislation the basis of -which is by restricting freedom of con-
Cf. e. g. Harrison v. Town, 17 Mo. 237, 244 (1S52); Davidson v.
Little, 22 Pa. St. 245, 252 (1853).
"1 D. 96.2.108; cf. Planiol, Traite, 2.532. The distinction was
drawn by the Byzantine scholiast Harmenopolous, ed. Heimbach, 364 n.
"1In Schweitzer v. Gibson, 321 Ill. 336, 151 N. E. 865 (1926), re-
lief was refused to the seller of a farm worth $8,000 in return for
bank stock which was not only worthless but actually carried with
it a liability, i. e., the price was less than nothing.
' Eliachevitch, Nolde, et al., Traite Dr. Civ. et Comm. Soy. 2.13.4.
OArts. 149, 150, 402. The injured party has no relief if the ex-
ploiter is the state bank, see Freund H., Zivilr. Sowietruss, 155.
"' See Eliachevitch, op. cit. 87 for details.
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tract to avoid lesion or exploitation of entire masses of the pop-
ulation. The evil which probably evoked the rescript of Diocle-
tian and certainly inspired Napoleon's defense of Art. 1674 of
his code has been drastically met in modern Germany by an
absolute prohibition upon the alienation of farm property.5 1
ANALYSIS OF THE DOCTRINE
Preceding any abstract discussion of the problem a few
criticisms are in order of the various solutions which have stood
the test of time to the extent that they still prevail. The codes
which deny relief may be here excluded, for instead of attempt-
ing a solution they ignore the problem. The remainder may be
divided into two categories: those like the French code which
impose strict limitations, and those which follow the wide prin-
ciple of the Germans. To show the inadequacy of the former
little need be said. According to the French authors there is
not a case on record where relief has been granted under Art.
1674. The nearest approach to it is the practice of the courts
of rescinding sales of land in return for an annuity the amount
of which does not seriously exceed the average annual rental
value of the property. This remedy is held to be more funda-
mental than Art. 1674 being barred in 30 years instead of 2;
moreover the lesion is not necessarily as great as 7/12. In short
the doctrine is justified by nothing in the code or in logic, and
is an example of the protection of the aged and infirm already
met with in the Anglo-American law.52 As for Art. 888, which
permits rescission of a division for lesion of more than a quarter,
even if the transaction was called a sale, etc., no reason is per-
ceived or has been discovered for allowing a co-owner to revoke
a voluntary act whereby he preferred for one reason or another
property of less value in the market. 53 To the German defini-
tion of "real" usury the main objection is its extensiveness.5 4
No exceptions are made for property the value of which is prob-
lematical, like curios and works of art,55 or for commercial trans-
n See Lowenstein, 45 Yale L. J. 799 ff.
5 See Planiol's note D. (1911), 1.353.
"A tendency to erect exceptions to this doctrine may be noted,
cf. Demogue, 649.
"This is voiced by the reporter in the first citation made, svpra
n. 36.
"It was otherwise in the Prussian Code, Dernburg, Lehrb. Pr.
Privatr., 2.356 n. 15.
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actions. Cases may be imagined where the Code provision seems
obviously to overshoot the mark. A dealer who ignores that an
object is a genuine Titian or piece of Lowestoft should not be
able to rescind the sale because the buyer happened to know or
think that such was the case. If, in order to obtain the money
to buy a family portrait, which he really desires, one sells what
he knows to be a Titian which he dislikes, it seems inequitable to
allow rescission on the ground that the owner ignored the present
value of the Titian. On the same score of inexperience, relief
would seem due to a tourist in a foreign country who pays for
an object more than what would have been obtained from a
native. The word Leichtsinn allows rescission of bargains on
the ground of their improvidence regardless of their intrinsic
justice. If articles de luxe are sold to one who cannot afford
them he may rescind although the price would have been un-
objectionable in the case of a richer buyer.56 One who could
not pay the price but agreed to do so in order to create inflated
credit for himself has been allowed relief though he was engaged
in the attempt to perpetrate a fraud.5 7 There is indeed plausi-
bility in the assertion of the other party that it is he who is in-
jured by the acquisition of a bad debt. Strangely enough the
German provision is from another standpoint too narrow; the
fact that the defendant is a usurer has led to the exclusion of
such cases as excessive charges by physicians, or contracts of
marine salvage, on the ground that the necessity is not eco-
nomic.5 8 The difficulties of defining necessity are clear when the
desire is to make a speculation with the proceeds of the trans-
action. Again a common criticism of the requirement is that-it
demands bad faith on the part of the defendant. 59 It is argued
that one may equally deserve relief though his position was un-
known to the other. This difficulty has, however, been met by
the Germans, who annul the transaction not as usurious but as
contrary to good morals.60 The truly usurious transaction dif-
fers in that the usurer is liable though the thing has perished
See Jur. Wochenschr. (1906), 366.
Seuff. Arch., 64 No. 2.
4See Brodmann in Ehrenberg's Handb. ges. Handelsr., 4.2.208;
contra Ennecerus n. 8.
" For the problem of putative necessity see Brodmann cit. 209.
6 Ennecerus, 589 (cf. infra n. 73), who goes on to mention the




without his fault and that the transfer of ownership is "void".
This latter point has occasioned tremendous dispute, e. g., as to
whether the usurer can complain if the transaction turns out to
his disadvantage. The Swiss Code thus accords only a unilateral
right of avoidance within a year. Bona fide third parties are,
nevertheless, protected in Germany, and not in France. With
respect finally to the Anglo-American system it leaves such un-
fettered power in the hands of the judges as to lead to arbitrari-
ness. In order to preserve family estates, sales by expectant
heirs were so severely dealt with as to evoke a corrective statute,
which in turn was denatured if not ignored by the judges.61
If the recipient of the benefit is a mistress or religious adviser,
the courts often annul the transaction more because of their own
prejudices than of any defect in the will of the donor.
3 2
Turning now to the true basis of a doctrine at present so
popular, it will be found on examination to be most elusive.
IMistake, fraud, duress, lack of causa, abuse of the right to con-
tract, exploitation of the weak, public policy, temporary or acci-
dental incapacity have all been suggested as the justifying factor,
and the very number of these expedients is a sufficient indication
of the logical weakness of the foundation. It is indeed far easier
to prove why the doctrine should be denied any place in the law.
The situation is further complicated by doubt as to the relative
significance of the injury to the plaintiff and the reprehensible
conduct of the defendant. Under these circumstances it seems
advisable to consider some of the possible permutations of the
typical hypotheses in which relief has been accorded. It may be
observed at the outset that the definite mathematical limit which
has been adopted following Diocletian's rescript is discarded for
obvious reasons. We may begin with objects like land, the value
of which is individual, not governed by a general custom of
charges. If he is a seller or lessor the injured party may ignore
the lesion, the case of mistake, or he may not, in which case he
acts either by some kind of compulsion or desires to make a dis-
guised gift. In the case of a buyer or lessee there is the further
Hereon see Pomeroy op. cit., sec. 953.
SCf. e. g. Norton v. Relly, 2 Eden 286; Lyon v. Home, 6 Eq.
655, 682; Shipman v. Furniss, 69 Ala. 555; Leighton v. Orr, 44 Ia. 679.
In the absence of an anti conventual bias it is hard to see how there
could have arisen any doubt whatsoever of the validity of the gift
in Allcard v. Skinner, 36 Ch. Div. 145.
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possibility that he has a personal affection for the object, which
of course excludes any claim for lesion. Similarly, the other
party may or may not know the value of the object or realize the
compulsion. The compulsion may be of various kinds besides
economic necessity: the seller may desire money at once in order
to make a speculation, e. g. to join the gold rush, or he may be
forced to make the disguised gift by the influence of his family
or friends. A priori it is not easy to see why an adult should be
allowed to rescind an unfavorable bargain of his own making
when the other party did no more than accept an offer, which
was or might have been made to anybody else. It is submitted
that the justification, if any, for such a rule must be sought in
the analogy to prodigality; the injured party is, as it were,
interdicted retroactively. In other words the transaction must
concern almost all the estate of the plaintiff, who should have
relatives or dependents to suffer thereby. Even here it may be
doubted if relief should be granted if the defendant is perfectly
innocent, e. g. he also ignored the fact that the property was
worth more than he paid, or not desiring it paid the money he
sorely needed at his friend's request. The situation is different
if the initiative is taken by the gainer. If he knows that the
price he names is more or less than others would offer and also
that the offeree ignores this fact, he is engaged in the attempt
falsely to represent the value. This representation is usually of
no importance because the other is assumed to disregard it, but
it ceases to be insignificant if the other is known to be weak,
trusting, gullible, or disturbed by economic or other dangers.
Thus is justified the ancient principle of the medieval commen-
tators, who insisted on a deceptio in their interpretation of Dio-
cletian's rescript. If on the other hand pressed by necessity the
seller agrees to the inadequate offer without knowing whether it
is fair or caring to inquire, the fraud has failed of its effect and
rescission if any should be granted on the score of prodigality.
Such a person prefers the slight sum of money to the object and
the only injury is to his dependents. As to the case of mistake,
here merely as to the value, its insignificance is generally ad-
mitted. An error as to value alone is conceivable only if the
mistaken party is indifferent, or grossly negligent in the failure
to make inquiries.
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There is another class of case where the analogy is to duress
rather than fraud, because the danger is physical and immediate,
leaving little or no opportunity for reflection or inquiry. The
typical case is that of marine salvage, wherein the courts of
Admiralty have always exercised the power of reducing the
agreed compensation as excessive.63 Similar to this situation is
that of one suffering from a disease who agrees with a physician
or a surgeon for a cure. If, as is usual, the exorbitance of the
reward is realized by the rescuer there seems in theory little
objection to the reduction. The difficulty lies in determining the
proper amount, for life is priceless and the services of the phy-
sician may be in fact or in general belief of unique excellence.
Moreover, a very slight reward may be enormous to the promisor
if he is poor, and conversely the services of the physician may in
such a case be particularly complicated and exacting so that he
can allege that but for the promise he would not have under-
taken the case. In view of the pricelessness of life it may be
aigued that no reduction is possible if the doctor reasonably
regarded the fee as moderate, but if he knowingly takes advan-
tage of the danger he seems hardly distinguishable from a black-
mailer or extortioner. Another case which might be here in-
eluded is the converse one where the reward for the services is
inadequate due to the desperate necessity of the worker. If hav-
ing vainly sought employment and reduced to despair he accepts
"starvation" wages, he may be said to have acted under fear of
death. However, only the Germans have taken the logical step
of treating labor as a commodity to the extent of permitting a
claim for the regular or customary wage. 6 4 The objection is that
in times of depression there may be no adequate regular wage
and also that later payment of a large sum hardly compensates
for the continual past privation. Moreover, the lesion is usually
general and impersonal, and the enterprise may have been pos-
sible only at the rate of wages actually paid, so that the em-
ployer is quite incapable of making the necessary refund. A
better if not an adequate remedy is the usual one of social leg-
islation, establishing minimum wages, etc.
Analogous to the starving and unemployed worker is the
poor debtor for whose benefit modern usury laws are established.
1 See The Elfrida, 172 U. S. 186 (1898), and cases cit.
"Cf. Ehrenberg (supra n. 58), 2.2.631.
LAxsio ENORMIS
The only distinction between the person injured by laesio
enormis and the victim of usury lies in the fact that the former
already has something to sell or with which to buy. Though it is
a branch of our topic the subject of usury has a history and lit-
erature of its own and is so connected with economics that only
the briefest remarks are in order. 65 Since Turgot and Bentham
it has been agreed by economists that statutes generally limiting
contractual rates of interest are more than futile, in that they
increase the evil by driving underground what should be a
legitimate enterprise. Instances are on record where debtors
who have been saved by a reasonable loan have used the statute
to escape a just liability.66 It appears to be the consensus of
opinion in America that protection is in order only for the poor
who need temporary small loans, in which case a fair rate of
interest may amount to as much as 50% per year. Such a debtor
must pay for his fellows who default or must do without credit
altogether. The evil of "moral usury", or lesion in our sense,
is due to the ignorance or timidity of the embarrassed person,
unable or unwilling to approach properly constituted channels
of credit. Such cases present either the element of duress in
so far as the borrower who has nothing must get the loan at any
cost, or that of fraud in that he is led to suppose that the charges
are not extortionate. 67 The American Ryan68 asserts that "no
one goes out to borrow $1,000 or $500 because of extremity or
necessitous circumstances" while in England one of the main
classes protected by the laws is the young man of fashion, heir
to a large or aristocratic estate. This character, who presented a
similar problem in ancient Rome (S. C. Macedonianum), has not
figured in the commercial and bourgeois society of America.6 9
Here as before the popular type of statute invented by the
Germans seems too extensive. If money is desired with which to
bet on a horse race the lender might easily be justified in stipu-
lating for the return of many times the sum lent. Where dis-
m The following remarks are largely based on the excellent little
book of an economist, Usury and Usury Laws, by F. W. Ryan (1924).
6'The public indignation against the borrower is described by
Ryan, 58.
,"For the element of fraud see Bellot, Bargains with Money-
lenders, 2 ed., 54.
"Op. cit., 77.
O'He may anyway be guarded by the "spendthrift" trust, more
difficult of constitution with respect to land, the asset of the English
gentry.
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charges in bankruptcy are allowed, he risks losing all and the
borrower obtains a chance to gain enormously. The question
what is a disproportionate sum in view of the risk, can, it seems,
be fairly answered only on the basis of commercial experienceju
It is believed that the proper legislation should not only be con-
fined to professional money lenders but also to particular types
of loans or borrowers.
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Another ease of lesion, mentioned by the French authors,
is that of excessive fees charged by mandataries. This differs
from those hitherto discussed in that the reduction is made
regardless of the circumstances of the mandator, who may be
well able to afford to pay the charge. It will be remembered
that in Rome all services of such dignity as to be incapable of
locatio conductio were subject if at all merely to remuneration
extra ordinem, so that the mandator could bind himself to pay a
definite sum only by the formal contract of stipulation. This
would tend to put the promisor on guard, causing him to make
inquiry and take advice before assuming the liability. The
dignity of the agent's position, the technical nature of his pro-
fession, mysterious to the layman, and the confidence reposed in
him by the client, are all elements tending to make him what is
called in Anglo-American law a fiduciary, i. e. one who owes a
duty of full disclosure of all relevant facts. As such relation-
ships become commercialized (cf. our trust companies) the lesion
will be less recognized. 7 2  If the service is of a stereotyped
nature the law may well attempt to maintain the reputation of
the profession by refusing to recognize charges the exorbitance
of which is not appreciated by the client. The situation is
analogous to that of prospective partners or spouses, where bar-
gaining is contrary to "public policy".
Again there is the general type of lesion affecting the whole
community or a class thereof, when necessities or widely mar-
keted products are sold at excessive prices. By monopolies, legal
or de facto, by extensive advertising, the public may be deprived
"0 Under the money lender's act in England 85% has been held not
excessive, see Hastings, Moneylenders, 63.
71Economists distinguish "productive" from "consumptive" loans.
Borrowing to bet on a horse race is of the former type.
2According to the Restatements of American law the duty Is
owed by an attorney to a prospective client (Agency, Sec. 390e), but
there seems to be doubt about the trustee (Trusts, Secs. 222d, 242h).
The importance of the idea of commercialization is noted by Ripert,
Regle Morale, 122.
LAEsio ENORMIS
of its chance to "shop around" and flid better bargains. As
the injury is here to rich and poor alike the problem is not one
for private law but for politics, and relief will be accorded by
the legislature in proportion to the power and organization of
the group. The French farmers may complain of a lesion of a
quarter in regard to chemical fertilizer while Americans con-
tinue to pay many times their actual value for cosmetics and
patent medicines. Laws to repress profiteering in necessities are
doubtless often rather attempts to placate consumers in time of
scarcity than reflections on the greed of the retailer. If the
enterprise is a purveyor of a necessity and also a monopoly,
like a railroad, gas, or electricity company, its contracts are
everywhere subject to control. In America this is usually done
by public service commissions. In Germany the case is the main
example of the non-usurious transaction contrary to good
morals.7 3 The practise by wholesalers of giving price discounts
to favored retailers cannot be truly classified as a lesion to those
not favored, it is a manifestation of the same type of commer-
cial pressure as that of "price cutting" to consumers.7 4
In the effort to cover the various situations recently pre-
sented as examples of lesion we have been driven far afield.
Every legal claim depends upon a lesion of some kind, and the
further we have progressed the more has been neglected the
requirement that the lesion be enormous. In truth our doctrine
should be confined to transactions where the parties are trying
and allowed to circumvent each other. In the absence of a bar-
gaining intent any lesion however small may offer ground for
rescission. Gifts are very freely annulled in Anglo-American
law on the score of undue influence, and for the same reason
they were void in Rome between husband and wife. The acqui-
sitions of one continually able to play on another's emotions are
jealously regarded by the courts.75 The general interest in the
security of transactions is at its minimum where the parties are
not dealing at arm's length. Of the transactions included the
Roman law spoke only of sales and leases (including those of
particular kinds of services). Now that there are no longer any
" See supra n. 60: on the French contrat d'adhesion cf. Ripert,
op. cit., 93 ff.
4 In America the recent Robinson-Patman Act attempts to pro-
hibit certain of these practices, cf. 50 Harv. Law Rev. 106.
"Cf. the facts in Morley v. Loughnan (1893), 1 Ch. 736.
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innominate contracts, there may be added exchange or "per-
mutation", compromise or "transaction' ",70 and loan at inter-
est, which is a kind of lease. Here the lesion may be only a
manifestation of a particular kind of fraud or extortion, if the
latter conception is extended to the threat not to rescue the
endangered person. In other cases relief is defensible only on
the principle of prodigality, and should never be available if the
injured party is a merchant and the transaction made in the
course of his business.7 7 From what has been said it follows
that the defendant should be treated as mala fide and so liable
whether or not he still has the fruits of the bargain.78 In this
respect as in its rejection of any arithmetical requirement the
provision of the German code represents an improvement from
the doctrines derived from Diocletian's rescript. It may be
added that most of the above considerations seem applicable to
promises of a penalty, where it is believed that theory and prac-
tise are often too indulgent to the promisor.
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